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Abstract—For many wiretap channel models asymptotically
optimal coding schemes are known, but less effort has been put
into actual realizations of wiretap codes for practical parameters.
Bounds on the mutual information and error probability when
using coset coding on a Rayleigh fading channel were recently
established by Oggier and Belfiore, and the results in this paper
build on their work. However, instead of using their ultimate
inverse norm sum approximation, a more precise expression
for the eavesdropper’s probability of correct decision is used
in order to determine a general class of good coset codes. The
code constructions are based on well-rounded lattices arising
from simple geometric criteria. In addition to new coset codes
and simulation results, novel number-theoretic results on well-
rounded ideal lattices are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wiretap setting it is assumed that the same message
is transmitted over two different channels, a channel to an
intended/legitimate receiver Bob and a different channel to an
eavesdropper Eve. Three contradicting objectives are simulta-
neously tried to be achieved: A high information rate between
the sender and Bob, high reliability at the legitimate receiver,
and minimal mutual information between the message and the
output at the eavesdropper.
Several different design criteria have been derived for secure
SISO wiretap channels, such as an eavesdropper’s probability
bound and an inverse norm sum approximation [1], and an
information bound [2]–[5], showing that both probability and
information are bound by the flatness factor. The current
design criteria for wiretap channels, such as the inverse norm
sum, are based on loose approximations and are not very
reliable in terms of comparing different codes. Hence, it is
desirable to derive new design criteria from tighter approx-
imations. Motivated by this, we study the eavesdropper’s
probability of correct decision and conclude that the coset
codes used for the transmissions should arise from well-
rounded (WR) lattices. By using WR sublattices of rotated Zn
lattices, one can simultaneously try to optimize for both low
and high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Furthermore, this allows
for the use of a skewed lattice for Eve while maintaining an
orthogonal lattice structure for Bob, as suggested in [6].
A. Related Work and Contributions
In this paper we reexamine design criteria suggested in
other works [1], [2]. We propose a new, simpler and more
geometric criterion, based on well-rounded (WR) lattices. The
construction of WR lattices by algebraic means is investigated
and a result on WR principal ideal lattices is obtained. After
constructing several examples in practical dimensions, their
superiority is supported by several simulations.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Wiretap Channel
We consider a wiretap channel as described by Wyner [7]. A
sender, Alice, transmits data over a possibly noisy channel to
a receiver Bob and a second noisy channel to an eavesdropper
Eve exists. The common assumption made is that the channel
to the eavesdropper has lower SNR, or is in some other way
more degraded, than the channel to the legitimate receiver.
Wyner investigated the possibility of transmitting data to the
receiver while having negligible mutual information with the
eavesdropper. He could show that a non-zero secrecy capacity
exists when a binary symmetric channel is considered. The
mutual information between variables X and Y is defined in
the usual way as
I(X,Y ) :=
∑
X
∑
Y
P[X,Y ] log
(
P[X,Y ]
P[X] P[Y ]
)
, (1)
see [8] for more details. We will consider a single-input single-
output (SISO) fast Rayleigh fading channel model [9], where
the information is mapped to vectors in a codebook x ∈ C ⊂
Rn that are then component-wise sent through the channel.
The vectors received by Bob and Eve are respectively given
by
y = HBx+ eB and z = HEx+ eE (2)
where H∗ = diag(h∗i ) is a n × n diagonal matrix with h∗i
being Rayleigh distributed fading coefficients with second raw
moment E[(h∗i )
2] = 1 and e ∈ Rn a Gaussian distributed error
vector where each entry has variance σ2∗.
It is commonly assumed that Bob, by virtue of his superior
channel, is able to decode correctly with high probability.
All elements relevant to the security of a scheme are related
to the channel to Eve and we will therefore from now on
only consider it and suppress the index E. Even though Eve’s
low SNR might lead her to decode incorrectly she might still
gather information from the transmission, as highlighted in the
following example.
Example 1. Given the one dimensional example where C =
{−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}, consider a channel where H = 1 and x = 1
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was sent but Eve receives a vector closer to 2 due to the error
term e. She decodes to 2, which is of course incorrect, but the
mutual information is far from being negligible, since she still
learned that the sent vector is highly unlikely to have been
−2,−1 or 0.
In a perfect setup Eve would not be able to gather any infor-
mation from the vector z. Having zero mutual information is
equivalent to every codeword being equally likely to have been
sent. Therefore a different strategy, coset coding, is employed
where one message m is represented by several different
codewords [m] ⊂ C in the codebook C. The probability that
m has been sent is given as the sum of the probabilities of the
different codewords that represent that message. This strategy
of course trades data rate for security. Information theoretically
we try to increase the entropy for the random variable z for
fixed x.
III. NEW DESIGN CRITERIA FOR NESTED LATTICE COSET
CODES
To achieve secret transmission of information, coset coding
in nested lattices has been suggested by Oggier and Belfiore
[10], based on ideas in [7] and [11]. We begin by introducing
lattices and some necessary notation.
Definition 1. A lattice Λ is the Z-linear span of a set
{b1, . . . , bm} ⊂ Rn of linearly independent basis vectors. We
call Λ a full-rank lattice if m = n.
The squared length of a shortest (non-zero) vector in Λ, the
minimum distance, is denoted by λ1(Λ). Each x ∈ Λ such
that ‖x‖2 = λ1(Λ) is called a minimal vector, and the set of
minimal vectors of Λ is denoted by S(Λ). The volume of a
lattice vol(Λ) := |det((bi)i)| where {bi}i is any basis for Λ
is an important invariant. The Hermite constant in dimension
n is defined as
γn := max
Λ⊂Rn
λ1(Λ)
vol(Λ)
2
n
. (3)
A. Nested Lattice Coset Coding
In nested lattice coset coding the codebook consists of
vectors from a lattice ΛB . This lattice is chosen such that
Bob is able to decode correctly with high probability. A
second lattice ΛE ⊂ ΛB is then chosen and every possible
message is mapped to an element in the quotient ΛB/ΛE .
Consequently, the information rate is determined by the index
[ΛB : ΛE ] :=
vol(ΛE)
vol(ΛB)
, not the actual codebook size. The
vector x is chosen as a random representative of the coset
belonging to the intended message. Hence, a codeword x is
the sum of the message m ∈ ΛB/ΛE (for a fixed shortest set
of representatives) and a random vector r ∈ ΛE . In practice
we restrict x to a finite region. This is done by restricting the
coefficients in the linear combinations of the basis elements
to a finite signaling set S ( Z.
For a finite codebook C ( Rn the data rate R := 1n log2(|C|)
in bits per channel use (bpcu) is split between the information
rate Ri from Alice to Bob, i.e., the actual amount of infor-
mation transmitted, and random bits Rc added to confuse the
eavesdropper
R = Ri +Rc =
1
n
log2([ΛB : ΛE ]) +
1
n
log2
( |C|
[ΛB : ΛE ]
)
.
(4)
Increasing the number of coset representatives and thus in-
creasing Rc reduces border effects but increases the average
energy by increasing the codebook size.
B. Correct Decoding Probability
In several papers [3], [4] a connection between Eve’s correct
decoding probability (ECDP) and the mutual information has
been established. Thus, we can use Eve’s correct decoding
probability ECDP as a measure of how much information
she can glean from z.
We point out that even if the probability would be quite
high, the mutual information can still be zero, meaning Eve
gains no information even though occasionally decoding cor-
rectly. Notice also that due to coset coding, there will be a
coset representative close-by regardless of how big the noise
is, as demonstrated by the lower bound 1[ΛB :ΛE ] . This is where
coset codes crucially differ from traditional lattice codes.
An analytic approximation for the correct decoding proba-
bility is developed in [1] as
ECDP = (2σE)
−n vol(ΛB)
∑
r∈ΛE
n∏
i=1
(
1 +
(
ri
σE
)2)− 32
. (5)
Here n is the dimension of the lattices involved. The authors
perform further approximations to come up with the so-called
inverse norm sum, also investigated in, e.g., [12], [13]. Here,
we do not take these further steps, but will analyze a more
precise version of the probability expression as explained
below.
Following the idea of i-th coding gains in [14] we expand
the product and bound from below by ignoring everything but
the constant, the linear and the leading term
n∏
i=1
(
1 +
(
ri
σE
)2)− 32
≤
(
1 +
n∑
i=1
(
ri
σE
)2
+
n∏
i=1
(
ri
σE
)2)− 32
.
(6)
The linear term corresponds to the squared length of the vector
σ−1E r, while the leading term is given by the squared product
distance dp,min(v) :=
∏n
i=1 |vi| of v = σ−1E r. Rotations of
Zn that maximize the minimum product distance have been
investigated in several publications such as [9] or [15]. These
increase reliability in channels with high SNR, or low σE ,
where the leading term is dominant. In channels with lower
SNR the linear term becomes more prominent and we should
choose our lattice ΛE such that it is maximized.
Since the shortest vectors of ΛE contribute the most by
the estimate (6) it is beneficial to maximize their length. This
is equivalent to increasing the sphere packing radius of the
lattice, i.e., maximizing the minimal length of its vectors.
Although optimal sphere packing lattices would provide
the longest minimal vectors achieving the Hermite constant,
these are not always available or even the best choice. Even
when an optimal integer lattice exists, e.g., D4 or E8 with
suitable scaling, they only provide us with limited choices for
indices. We therefore suggest a more general class of lattices,
namely well-rounded lattices, which are available for many
different parameters. In this paper we will focus on (possibly
rotated) sublattices of Zn. The rotations are algebraic, so the
lattices remain integral and can be used to guarantee good
performance in the high SNR regime. We use the standard
pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) for the lattice coordinates
We sum up our design criterion in the following proposition,
antedating the definition in the following section, but postpone
a rigorous proof to an extended journal version.
Proposition 1. Well-rounded lattices optimize expression (6)
in the low SNR regime and give rise to good sublattices for
coset coding.
IV. WELL-ROUNDED LATTICES
Definition 2. A lattice Λ is called well-rounded (abbreviated
WR) if the set S(Λ) of minimal vectors contains n linearly
independent vectors.
The set of minimal vectors S(Λ) does not necessarily form
a basis for Λ [16, Chapter 2]. They are known to form a
basis for all n ≤ 4 as mentioned in [17]. This motivates the
following stronger definition.
Definition 3. A lattice Λ is called (strongly) well-rounded if
the set of minimal vectors S(Λ) generates Λ.
If a lattice is WR, then the set of minimal vectors S(Λ)
generates a sublattice of Λ that is also WR. Hence, from now
on, we only work with WR lattices as in Definition 3.
More generally, WR lattices are of interest in investigations
of sphere packing, sphere covering, and kissing number prob-
lems as well as in coding theory as shown in [17]–[19]. A
particularly interesting class of WR lattices are the integral
well-rounded (IWR) lattices. The properties of WR lattices
in the plane which come from ideals in quadratic fields have
been studied by Fukshansky et al. In [20] and [21], the authors
presented a characterization of WR ideal lattices in the plane
and proved that even asymptotically a positive proportion
of real and imaginary quadratic number fields contain ideals
giving rise to WR lattices. We provide two new related results
in the next section.
There is an easy criterion that relates the volume of a WR
sublattice to the length of its minimal vectors using Hermite
constants.
Lemma 1. For a full rank WR lattice of volume V it holds
that V
2
n ≤ λ1 ≤ γnV 2n , where γn is the Hermite constant for
dimension n.
A. Well-Rounded Ideal Lattices
WR lattices that come from ideals of number fields are
also called well-rounded ideal lattices. Well known examples
of these lattices are the ring of integers and its ideals of
cyclotomic fields [21]. In [20] and [21], the authors proved
the existence of infinitely many real and imaginary quadratic
fields that contain WR ideal lattices and studied their prop-
erties. A sufficient (resp. equivalent) condition for a positive
square-free integer D such that the quadratic field Q(
√
D)
(resp. Q(
√−D)) contains WR ideal lattices was also given.
However, for an arbitrary number field of degree at least three,
the existence and structure of WR ideal lattices are unknown.
In this section, we further concentrate on real quadratic
fields F . Regarding computational aspects, the norms of ideals
are frequently considered in comparison with the discriminant
of F . The relevance of the norm for our purposes arises from
the fact that it corresponds to the nesting index and hence
relates to the information rate, as we will see in this section.
Here, we first present a result saying that WR ideal lattices of
F have large norms compared to the discriminant. This is a
nice result also from a practical point of view, since optimizing
the minimum product distance is equivalent to minimizing the
discriminant [9], whereas large norms are preferable due to
their relation to the information rate.
In addition, we discuss a class of WR lattices that are gen-
erated from principal ideals. This also provides an answer to
the question proposed in [20, Question 2] about the existence
of WR principal ideal lattices of real quadratic fields.
Definition 4. Let F be a totally real number field of degree n.
There are exactly n distinct field homomorphisms σi : F −→
R for i = 1, . . . , n. The map σ : F −→ Rn defined by σ(α) =
(σ1(α), . . . σn(α)) is called the canonical embedding of F .
Let F be a totally real number field of degree n with the
ring of integers OF . The images of ideals in OF under σ
are lattice in Rn. We denote by ΛI = σ(I) the lattice in Rn
corresponding to the ideal I in OF and ΛF = σ(OF ). Then
ΛI is a sublattice of ΛF . Moreover, the norm N(I) of I is
also the index of ΛI in ΛF and hence it gives the information
rate as described below.
Proposition 2. Let ΛE = ΛI and ΛB = ΛF . Then N(I) =
[ΛB : ΛE ] = 2
nRi .
Remark 1. Under the canonical embedding, the algebraic
integers are mapped to the lattice ΛF , which will be the
underlying structure of our codes. Optimal rotations of Zn
based on ideal lattices arising from canonical embeddings can
be found in [22]. We shall use these algebraic rotations to
rotate our coset codes for the simulations, to guarantee a large
minimum product distance and hence good performance for
Bob.
Let D be a positive, square-free integer and and let F =
Q(
√
D). The discriminant ∆ of F is equal to 4D or D
depending on whether D ≡ 2, 3 (mod 4) or D ≡ 1 (mod 4)
respectively. The canonical embedding σ of F is determined
by σi : F −→ R for i = 1, 2 where σ1(
√
D) =
√
D
and σ2(
√
D) = −√D as in Definition 4. Each element
x + y
√
D ∈ F with x, y ∈ Q is mapped to the vector
(σ1(x+ y
√
D,σ2(x+ y
√
D)) = (x+ y
√
D,x− y√D) ∈ R2
via σ. Assume that I has a Z-basis {α, β}. The vectors
{b1 = (σ1(α), σ2(α)), b2 = (σ1(β), σ2(β))} form a Z-basis
of ΛI . In other words, the lattice ΛI can be represented as
ΛI =
[
σ1(α) σ1(β)
σ2(α) σ2(β)
]
Z2. (7)
The following new results are obtained. The proofs are
omitted due to lack of space and will appear in an extended
version of this paper [23].
Proposition 3. If ΛI is a WR ideal lattice in OF , then N(I) ≥√
3∆
4 .
In [20], the authors proved that for imaginary quadratic field
F = Q(
√−D), the ring of integers contains principal WR
ideals if and only if D = 1, 3. For real quadratic fields, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. There are infinitely many real quadratic fields
F = Q(
√
D) with a positive square-free integer D ≡ 3
(mod 4), respectively D ≡ 1 (mod 4), such that OF contains
principal WR ideals.
Remark 2. Determining whether there exists an integer D ≡ 2
(mod 4) such that the quadratic field Q(
√
D) has WR prin-
cipal ideals is still an open problem. A computational search
based on Lemma 1 showed that Q(
√
D) does not contain any
WR principal ideals of index at most 2D for any even integer
D ≤ 103.
The table below illustrates some examples of WR principal
ideals ΛI of real quadratic fields F = Q(
√
D) for some
positive, square-free integer D given in the first column. The
second column contains a generator of principal ideals I . The
index of the WR lattice ΛI is shown in the last column.
D
≡
3
(m
o
d
4
)
D A generator of I Index
3 3 +
√
3 6
15 5 +
√
15 10
35 7 +
√
35 14
143 13 +
√
143 26
195 15 +
√
195 30
D
≡
1
(m
o
d
4
) 21 7
2
−
√
21
2
7
77 11
2
−
√
77
2
11
165 15
2
−
√
165
2
15
221 17
2
−
√
221
2
17
285 19
2
−
√
285
2
19
TABLE I
SOME WR PRINCIPAL IDEALS IN Q(
√
D)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Probabilistic Lattice Search
It is possible to find all WR sublattices of a given lattice and
a given index by searching through all possible combinations
of vectors of suitable lengths, as described by Lemma 1. For-
tunately, WR lattices are common enough that a probabilistic
algorithm often suffices.
Most lattices in the simulations were found after only
minutes of randomly testing combinations of integer vectors
of same length for linear independence and then using the
LLL-algorithm to determine λ1 for the lattice they generate.
B. Well-Rounded Ideal Lattices
We simulated the ECDP for two WR principal ideals and a
sublattice of Z2, all having index 216. More details are given
in the table below.
Lattice Field Ideal λ1 Ri Rc
ΛI1 Q[
√
3] (18 + 6
√
3) 249.42 3.87744 1.12326
ΛI2 Q[
√
15] (18 + 6
√
15) 223.08 3.87744 1.13166
Λ3 ⊂ Z2 - - 234 3.87744 1.12185
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF LATTICES AFTER NORMALIZATION
A generator matrix for Λ3 is given by ( 3 1515 3 ). In Fig. 1, the
simulation results for the ECDP are compared for these three
lattices and it can be seen that they perform very similarly.
We will therefore look at some higher dimensional examples
that allow for significant differences in λ1.
SNR
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
EC
DP
10 -2
10 -1
$ I
1
$ I
2
Z2 lattice
1/216
Fig. 1. ECDP for WR ideal lattices and a sublattice of Z2 with index 6
C. Z4 sublattices
In this section, we show simulation results for three
different sublattices of Z4,
Λ1 =

16 0 0 0
0 4 0 0
0 0 2 0
0 0 0 2
Z4, Λ2 =

4 0 0 0
0 4 0 0
0 0 4 0
0 0 0 4
Z4, Λ3 =

−2 −3 4 −1
0 −1 0 3
0 −3 −2 −3
−4 −1 0 −1
Z4
with parameters as shown in Table III.
These lattices are chosen because they provide a good
sample of different types of lattices with the same information
rate and showcase the importance of the λ1 parameter. In Fig.
2, the simulation results for the correct decoding probability
ECDP are shown. It can clearly be seen, that the lattice with
larger λ1 outperforms the other two and it is the only one that
comes close to reaching the theoretical lower bound of 1[ΛB :ΛE ]
and hence negligible mutual information. Similar phenomenon
can be observed for higher dimensional examples.
D. Cross-Packing
In a recent paper [24] a new construction was suggested
that aims at minimizing the error probability for Rician
channels. This channel model is a generalization of the
Lattice λ1 WR index Ri Rc
Λ1 4 no 256 2 2
Λ2 16 yes 256 2 2
Λ3 20 yes 256 2 2
TABLE III
PARAMETERS FOR THREE DIFFERENT SUBLATTICES OF Z4
SNR
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
EC
DP
10 -3
10 -2
10 -1
$1
$2
$3
1/256
Fig. 2. Simulation of ECDP for three different Z4 sublattices
Gaussian and the Rayleigh channel models and features
an additional parameter K. For K = 0 it simplifies to the
Rayleigh channel observed here. For small K they observe
that the contour lines of the error probability are cross shaped
and abstract a cross distance for integer vectors for which
they design lattices of minimum cross distance 2t+ 1 for all
dimensions n ≥ 2. We compare their cross packing lattice B4
with t = 6 with a WR sublattice Λ of Z4 of the same index
302 (we use a LLL-reduced basis of B4 here):
B4 =

−1 1 2 2
−1 0 2 −5
1 −2 5 −1
−1 −5 1 2
Z4, Λ =

1 1 3 −2
−4 1 0 −4
−1 −2 3 1
2 −4 2 −1
Z4
SNR
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
EC
DP
10 -3
10 -2
10 -1
cross-packing
well-rounded
Fig. 3. Comparison of a Cross-Packing Lattice with a WR lattice
Fig. 3 shows that the WR lattice outperforms the cross
packing. We also point out that the cross-packing construction
is only available for indices t3 + 2t2 + 2t+ 2 with t ∈ N.
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